Rosales-Lagarde, A. (2016). Neurophenomenology?s Epistemological Locus and the Need to Consider Its Primitive Sources: Internal Processing and Development. Peer Commentary on Solomonova and Shas, Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience. The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research. Constructivist Foundations, 11, 722-724. ISSN 1782-348X
Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the subpersonal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams? enaction and, especially, dreams? perception-dependence, an innate and developmental framework of neurophenomenology becomes a requirement to understand fully its sub-personal counterpart, i.e., sleep, especially the evidence derived from innate processing observed during the sleep of neonates ? even without the dreaming counterpart. Finally, precisions about the depth of dreaming in Hobson?s work are presented.